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Abstract
Crowdsourcing platforms offer a way to label data by aggregating answers of multiple unqual-
ified workers. We introduce a simple and budget efficient crowdsourcing method named Proxy
Crowdsourcing (PCS). PCS collects answers from two sets of workers: leaders (a.k.a proxies)
and followers. Each leader completely answers the survey while each follower answers only a
small subset of it. We then weigh every leader according to the number of followers to which
his answer are closest, and aggregate the answers of the leaders using any standard aggrega-
tion method (e.g., Plurality for categorical labels or Mean for continuous labels). We compare
empirically the performance of PCS to unweighted aggregation, keeping the total number of
questions (the budget) fixed. We show that PCS improves the accuracy of aggregated answers
across several datasets, both with categorical and continuous labels. Overall, our suggested
method improves accuracy while being simple and easy to implement.
1 Introduction
Crowdsourcing is the process of completing tasks by soliciting contributions from a large group of
people. In recent years, crowdsourcing has become increasingly prevalent, and is being used for
a variety of tasks including data collection and labeling, prediction and open innovation. While
crowdsourcing enables leveraging a large pool of workers, the quality of contributions strongly
depends on workers’ capabilities and motivation which varies widely across workers. In particular,
since crowdsourcing workers are usually not experts and since some workers might not exert effort,
answers obtained may be erroneous [13, 25, 26]. Thus, increasing the accuracy and efficiency of
crowdsourced work is an important area of research [20, 1].
The overall quality of the crowdsourced task is determined by two factors: the quality of in-
puts (answers) provided by the individual crowd workers, and the method used to aggregate those
answers. Prior work has examined ways to improve the quality of inputs (e.g., by providing
performance-based monetary incentives [27]), as well as at methods for aggregating multi-source
noisy estimations toward “truth discovery” [15, 10].
Aggregation of opinions is closely related to social choice, where the opinions or preferences
of multiple voters are aggregated using some voting method. Mao et al. [18, 19] compared the
performance of various voting rules for aggregating rankings, and showed that some of them yield an
outcome that is significantly closer to the ground truth than others. More generally, Mao et al. argue
that while sophisticated statistical methods have been developed for specific human computation
tasks, these tools often require “significant amount of data, work, knowledge, and computational
resources,” ([18], p. 141) which highlights the advantage of using simple voting rules.
In this paper we suggest to use a simple heuristic that is based on proxy voting to improve the
accuracy of aggregated answers in crowdsourcing platforms. Proxy voting allows voters not to vote
directly, and instead select a proxy (presumably another voter with similar opinions) to vote on their
behalf. Several papers analyzed the benefits of proxy voting to society from theoretical and empirical
aspects (see related work). In a recent theoretical paper, Cohensius et al. [3] showed that with proxy
voting, the preferences of a large population from a given distribution can be represented well with
only a small subset of “active voters”. Therefore, we hypothesize that similar ideas can be applied
to the problem of aggregating answers of crowd workers.
In this paper, we suggest a Proxy Crowdsourcing (PCS) policy, where answers are collected from
two groups: leaders answer the complete set of questions, while followers are asked only a random
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subset of the questions, which are only used to find the “closest” leader. Then, we aggregate the
leaders’ answers, where each leader is weighted by the number of followers to which she is closest.
The PCS method is not supposed to replace existing aggregation methods, but rather to boost
their performance by properly weighing the workers or experts. For example, with PCS, instead of
asking (say) 10 workers to answer 100 questions each and take the majority answers, we may ask
only 5 workers (the leaders) to answer everything, and use the remaining budget to collect answers
from 25 additional workers (the followers) who will answer 20 questions each. The aggregated
answer is then calculated by taking the Weighted Majority of the 5 leaders.
As such, proxy crowdsourcing has potential to improve the accuracy of crowdsourcing while
the total effort by workers remains fixed1. This paper examines the use of proxy crowdsourcing
and identifies conditions under which PCS leads to higher quality outcomes (i.e., outcomes that are
closer to the ground truth).
1.1 Related work
Improving the efficiency and quality of crowdsourcing The crowdsourcing literature has ex-
plored several avenues for improving the quality of workers’ inputs. Some works focused on
designing monetary incentives for workers to elicit higher quality inputs. For example, different
schemes of providing workers bonus payments have been proposed and studied [29, 27, 28, 22],
and peer prediction rules have been used in payment schemes to incentivize truthful reporting by
workers [12, 7, 21]. Other works have suggested non-monetary incentives, such as engaging work-
ers by increasing their curiosity [14] or eliciting commitments from workers to provide high quality
inputs [6]. Our approach does not attempt to directly improve the quality of the input provided by
workers, but rather aggregates inputs in a way that aims to assign higher weights to higher quality
workers.
Another practice commonly used to increase the quality of crowdsourcing is to monitor the
quality of workers’ responses by implementing “gold questions” with known answers in order to
filter workers that fail in those questions [30, 8]. To improve the effectiveness of this approach,
Bragg et al. [2] proposed methods for determining the optimal amount of gold questions to include.
Some works have further explored the use of planning approaches to dynamically determine when
to collect additional inputs from workers based on confidence in the current solution [4, 11]. Proxy
crowdsourcing aims to reduce the number of inputs required without requiring the use of sophisti-
cated planning methods.
Research in crowdsourcing has also considered different methods of aggregating the responses
obtained from individual workers to achieve higher quality results [10, 11, 23, 24, 17]. Most closely
related to our approach, Venanzi et al. [24] identify “communities” of workers that are similar to
each other when workers only provide answers to part of the question set, and use a Bayesian
computation to aggregate the inputs from the different communities. In contrast to this approach,
proxy crowdsourcing aims to determine a priori how to utilize a budget (i.e., how many answers to
elicit from workers), and does not require complex estimation computations in the aggregation of
workers’ inputs.
Importantly, we note that the proxy crowdsourcing approach is complimentary to most of the
other approaches for improving the quality and efficiency of crowdsourcing processes, and can be
used in conjunction with these approaches.
For an overview of proxy voting in the context of preference aggregation (i.e., when there is no
ground truth), see Cohensius et al. [3].
1Although we do not tackle this point explicitly, reducing the amount of feedback required from each voter has received
some attention in the social choice literature (see, e.g. [16, 5]), as means to lower the cognitive burden on human participants.
1.2 Contribution
We evaluate PCS versus standard aggregation methods on a wide range of datasets in several do-
mains: some synthetic, some collected for this paper, and some that were collected for different
purposes by other researchers.
Our evaluation shows that for almost all datasets, it is beneficial to aggregate the crowdsourcing
answers using PCS, in the sense that it decreases the expected distance between the aggregated
answers and the ground truth. In some datasets the improvement reaches up to 32%.
We analyze the reasons for this improvement by looking at the initial distribution of workers’
competence, and the distribution of leaders’ weights after the aggregation. We establish a prelimi-
nary theoretical result that explains why more accurate answer vectors get higher weights.
2 Model
We denote by JXK the indicator variable of event X . [k] is a shorthand for {1, . . . , k}.
LetXk be a k-dimensional Euclidean space, and d be a distance metric onXk. LetX⊥ def= X∪⊥,
where ⊥ is a missing entry. Denote by X k⊥ the space of partial vectors of X k. We shall make use
of the tilde notation, i.e. x˜, to indicate that a vector is partial. Denote by ⊥(x˜),>(x˜) ⊆ [k],
respectively, the missing and valid entries of x˜ ∈ X k⊥.
We denote by x(j) the j-th entry of a vector x. Given a (partial) vector x˜ and subset of indices
A ⊆ >(x˜), we define x˜(A) = (x˜(i))i∈A ∈ X |A|. We extend the pseudo-distance function d to
partial vectors by only considering joint entries:
d(x˜1, x˜2)
def
= d(x˜1(A), x˜2(A)),
where A = >(x˜1) ∩ >(x˜2).
Given a multi-set of (complete) vectors SM = {x1, . . . ,xm} and a partial vector x˜, we denote
by NN(SM , x˜) the multi-set of vectors in SM that are the closest to x˜ according to d. Formally,
NN(SM , x˜) = argminj∈M d (xj , x˜) .
Aggregation with leaders An aggregation rule is a function g : Rm × X k·m → X k. That is, a
function that maps a set of m weighted complete vectors to a single vector xˆ = g(wM , SM ).2
An instance in the space (X k, d) is a tuple (SM , S˜N ), where:
• SM = {x1, . . . ,xm} is a set of complete answers (“leaders”);
• S˜N = {x˜1, . . . , x˜n} is a set of partial answers (“followers”);
Given an instance and an aggregation rule g, the aggregated answer vector is g(SM , S˜N , d) =
g(wM , SM ) where wj = 1+
∑
i∈N
Jj∈NN(SM ,x˜i)K
|NN(SM ,x˜i)| . That is, the number of followers to which xj is
closest, where each follower divides her voting weight equally among all of her nearest neighbors.
Example 1. Consider a space (X k, d) where X = {0, 1}, k = 4, and d is the Hamming distance.
Let g be the Weighted Majority function. Consider
SM = {(0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1, 0), (1, 1, 1, 1)}, S˜N = {(⊥, 1,⊥, 1), (⊥, 0, 1,⊥)}.
Then NN(SM , x˜1) = {2, 4} and NN(SM , x˜2) = {1, 3, 4}. Thus, the weights are w1 = w3 =
1 13 , w2 = 1
1
2 , w4 = 1
5
6 . The aggregated answer is xˆ = (0, 1, 1, 1).
2More precisely, this is a class of functions, one for every m. We only use simple and neutral aggrega-
tion rules where the effect of weights is like duplicating voters. That is, g((w1, . . . , wi + 1, . . . , wm), SM ) =
g((w1, . . . , wi, 1, . . . , wm), (x1, . . . ,xi,xi, . . . ,xm)).
Evaluation metrics Given a ground truth vector x∗ and an aggregated answer vector xˆ, We call
d(xˆ,x∗) the aggregated error. For every individual worker j, we call d(xj ,x∗) the individual error
of worker j.
Crowdsourcing policies Consider a populationW of workers, which is a distribution over com-
plete answer vectors X k.
A crowdsourcing policy with leaders (or just policy) is a tuple (m,n, α, g, d), where m is the
number of leaders; n is the number of followers; α is the fraction of answers that each follower
should answer; g is an aggregation rule; and d is a distance metric.
A policy is used first to sample an instance from the population, and then to aggregate answers
of this instance as follows. The policy samples m full vectors SM from W and n partial vectors
S˜N with bαkc valid entries (selected uniformly at random). Then, an aggregated answer xˆ =
g(SM , S˜N , d) is computed. Note that xˆ is a random variable.
E.g., if we have unlimited budget, we can recruit and aggregate a large number of workers to
reduce the error. However, we assume that the budget is limited, and that the required budget is
linear in the total number of questions we ask.
To evaluate the benefit of using leaders, we define PCSα,β(B) the policy that spends a total
budget of B, where a fraction β from this budget is spent on followers who provide answers on αk
of the questions.
Except when specified otherwise, the policies we will use to compare crowdsourcing with and
without leaders are PCS(B) = PCS0.2,0.33(B) and CS(B) = PCS0,0(B), respectively.
For example, if k = 20 and B is sufficient for 1200 answers, then CS(B) results in the policy
(m = 60, n = 0, α = 0, g, d) (60 workers that answer all questions); whereas PCS(B) results in
the policy (m = 40, n = 100, α = 0.2, g, d). That is, 40 leaders will answer all 20 questions, and
the remaining half of the budget will be spent on 100 followers who will answer bαkc = 4 random
questions each.
3 Empirical Methodology
We evaluated the use of proxy voting on datasets from three sources: 1. datasets we collected using
Amazon Mechanical Turk; 2. existing datasets from [22]; 3. datasets we generated from simple
distributions for specified parameters. Workers were randomly divided into leaders and followers.
These datasets included a variety of tasks differing in the types of questions asked (e.g., multiple
choice questions, continuous assessments). We next describe these in more detail.
In the datasets we collected, participants were given short instructions,3 then they had to answer
k = 25 questions. We recruited participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk. We restricted par-
ticipation to workers that had at least 50 assignments approved. We plant in each survey a simple
question that can be easily answered by a anyone who understand the instructions of the experi-
ment (known as Gold Standards questions). Participants who answered correctly the gold standard
question received a payment of $0.3. Participants did not receive bonuses for accuracy. The study
protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the Technion.
For each new or existing dataset, we mention below the total number of collected answer vectors.
However we emphasize that unless specified otherwise, aggregation was always performed with the
CS(B) and PCS(B) policies, whereB is sufficient budget for exactly 12 complete answer vectors.
For robustness, we tested each policy by sampling 5000 instances with replacements, using the entire
dataset as our populationW . For each instance, we computed the distance from the aggregated result
xˆ to the ground truth x∗ of the dataset, and averaged the aggregated error over all instances. We
refer to the average expected error of a policy as the loss.
3see survey in https://goo.gl/W47X5R.
Figure 1: Representative questions of the Comparing dots (left) and Buildings’ height (right) tasks.
In the Comparing dots task, each worker was presented with a pair of dot figures, and had to de-
termine which figure contained more dots. In the Buildings’ height task, each worker was given
a picture of a building, and had to estimate the building height in meters by selecting a number
between 0 and 1000 along a slider.
3.1 Binary questions
Each question has two possible answers, X = {a, b}. Hamming distance was used to calculate
distances between vectors. Namely, the distance between two vectors is the number of questions on
which they disagree. As an aggregation rule g we use Weighted Plurality, herein denoted by wpl.
Formally,
wpl(wM , Sm)
(j) def=
{
a if
∑
i∈SM :x(j)i =a
wi >
m
2
b if
∑
i∈SM :x(j)i =b
wi >
m
2
,
and ties are broken uniformly at random. Note that in the binary case, Weighted Plurality and
Weighted Majority coincide. The following datasets were examined:
Comparing Dots 41 workers were shown 25 pairs of pictures and had to estimate which picture out
of the two has more dots4
Golden Gate 35 workers were asked 21 questions of identifying if the picture contains the Golden
Gate Bridge. This dataset was collected by [22].
3.2 Categorical questions
Each question has a discrete set of answers, X = {a, b, . . . , l}, and the distance function is the
hamming distance. As in the Binary domain, we aggregate answers using wpl defined above when
4A similar task was performed in [19], where workers ordered a set of four pictures by increasing number of dots. While
we used their dataset in a preliminary version of this paper, we found it unsuitable for the current paper since we wanted
datasets where every participant makes more decisions.
domain X Task: Workers k (Questions) Categories E[error] σ(error)
Binary Comparing Dots 41 25 2 10.5 2.86
Golden Gate [22] 35 21 2 4.7 3.4
Heads of Countries [22] 32 20 4 1.8 2.6
Categorical Flags [22] 35 126 4 47.8 29.6
Dogs [22] 31 85 10 11.9 11.4
Continuous Buildings’ Height 208 25 1001 5271 3074
Counting dots 201 25 1001 6159 1656
Table 1: Summary of datasets. For each dataset, we include the population size |W |, number of
questions k, and the mean and variance of the individual error.
naturally extended to multiple possible answers. We used the following datasets, all collected by
[22]:
Dogs 31 workers answered 85 questions, identifying the breed of the dog in the picture. We omitted
4 workers due to missing data in their report.
Heads of Countries 32 workers answered 20 questions, identifying heads of countries. We omitted
3 workers due to missing data in their report.
Flags 35 workers answered 126 questions, identifying countries to which flags belong.
3.3 Continuous questions
X is an interval [0, H]. The distance metric is the L1-norm, thus d(x,x′) = ∑j≤k |x(j) − x′(j)|.
We used the Weighted Mean, denoted by wmn, as an aggregation function5. Formally,
wmn(wM , Sm)j =
∑
i∈M
wix
(j)
i .
We examined the following datasets:
Buildings’ Height 208 workers were shown 25 buildings pictures, they were asked to estimate their
height in meters. In Figure 1 we illustrate one such question.
Counting Dots 201 workers were shown 25 pictures of dots, they had to estimate the number of
dots in each picture. Counting dots in images has been suggested as a benchmark task for human
computation in [19, 9].
4 Analysis
Our main observation is that PCS improves accuracy of the aggregate answers by up to 30% as
summarized in Table 2.
4.1 Why PCS improves accuracy
Possible (incorrect) explanation: sampling more workers reduces dependencies PCS sample
more vectors, thus the dependency between answers decreases. We conjectured that this dependency
5We also considered the Weighted Median, which produced roughly the same results and hence omitted.
domain X Task: CS(12k) PCS0.2,0.33(12k) improvement [%]
Binary Comparing dots 8.40 8.56 -1.90
Golden gate [22] 2.16 1.88 12.96
Heads of countries[22] 0.10 0.09 10.00
Categorical Flags [22] 20.97 14.42 31.23
Dogs [22] 2.98 2.69 9.73
Continuous Buildings’ height 3315 3075 7.24
Counting Dots 5268.5 5188 1.53
Table 2: Results summary. Expected loss comparison across all our datasets between CS and PCS
that spends β = 1/3 of the budget on followers and followers answers on α = 0.2 of the questions
in the survey. The budget B is sufficient for 12k answers in each domain. That is, 12 workers that
answer on all the questions or 8 leaders and 40 followers.
decrease might reduce the loss. We compared CS to a policy were same budget is spent entirely on
partial vectors. This method had the same loss as CS, therefore we rejected this explanation.
Better leaders get higher weight The improvement of PCS over CS is explained by the weights
of leaders: we argue that better leaders receive higher expected weight. In Figure 2 (left), we used
the policy PCS0.2,0.375(16k) which means we sample 10 leaders and 30 followers. We sampled
workers from the Flags dataset. At each instance we sorted the leaders by their individual error and
calculated their weights. The best leader got about twice the weight of worst leader. The observation
that better leaders get higher weight is true across all of our datasets, but its magnitude differs. An-
other common observation is that the weakest leader gets higher weight than higher ranked leaders,
the reason is that in some populations there is a group of weak workers (worse than random click-
ers), those weak workers delegate their voting weight with high probability to the weakest leader.
Figure 2 (right) shows that weighting of the leaders improve the outcome substantially.
Figure 2: On the left, leaders voting weight sorted by their individual error. Averaged across 5000
instances, over the Flags dataset. Rank 1 means the leader with the lowest individual error in the
sample, rank 10 means the leader with the highest individual error in the sample. On the right, the
orange triangles shows the loss according to PCS0.2,β(12k), for reference, in blue dots, the loss for
the same leaders when they are unweighted (only leaders, without followers).
4.2 Factors that effect PCS
Expected loss as a function of the policy The expected loss depends on the policy used, that is,
the way in which the budget is divided between obtaining leaders and followers. When increasing
β (the fraction of the budget spent to on followers), the expected loss decreases until reaching an
optimum. Further increasing β beyond this point results in higher loss compare to CS. The optimal β
value depends on the dataset and ranges between 1/3 and 1/2. Higher β typically reduces accuracy
because a sufficient number of leaders is needed for some high-quality leaders to be present, when
some high-quality leader exists, adding followers is more cost effective.
To check this claim we evaluated the expected loss of PCS0.2,β(B) when using different β val-
ues and different budgets over all datasets. Figure 3 shows the expected loss generated by CS(12k)
and PCS0.2,β(12k) across different values of β on the Flags dataset. Results were averaged over
5000 instances (similarly to the results in the Table 2). The results are typical to most of the datasets
and most budget values. Indeed, we see in Figure 3 that spending budget on followers is beneficial
up to a certain amount (for this dataset and budget, the optimum is at β = 1/3).
Figure 3: Expected loss as a function of β, the fraction of the budget spent to buy followers. The
dashed line is the loss when using the CS policy (all the budget is used to pay for leaders). The
continuous line uses PCS0.2,β(12k) (which means β of the budget is used to buy followers, and
each follower is answering 0.2 of the questions.
Expected loss as a function of the datasets
1. Domain: PCS is more effective in Categorical domain rather than Binary domain. Table
2 provides anecdotal evidence for this claim. Intuitively, for PCS to work well, accurate
workers must be close to other workers while inaccurate workers should be far from other
workers. Consider two workers and one question and assume both workers provide a wrong
answer for the question. In the binary domain their distance from each other is 0, while in the
categorical domain they can be wrong in different ways so their distance can be 1.
2. Number of questions: PCS is more effective in datasets with high number of questions
As the number of questions grows, the probability for incompetent workers to be wrong on
the same question (with the same wrong answer) decreases, therefore the probability for a
follower to follow incompetent leader decreases. See section 5 for a preliminary theorem. In
Table 2 we see that the dataset with the highest number of question has the highest improve-
ment rate of PCS.
3. Individual error Variance: PCS is more effective when the variance of workers’ Indi-
vidual error is high. When variance is high, some followers with high individual error can
follow leaders with low individual error. When variance is low, followers will follow sim-
ilar quality of leaders which will not improve the results. In order to verify this claim, we
produced a synthetic population in the following manner: each worker has a competence pa-
rameter pi ∈ (0, 1). A worker i with competence pi answers each question correctly w.p. pi.
Errors are independent across questions and workers. The competence of each worker was
sampled from a uniform distribution over an interval [v1, v2], where v1 and v2 are parameters.
Figure 4: Loss as a function of β. Synthetic populations with similar mean but different variance of
their judgment competence p.
Figure 4 shows a comparison of populations that have similar competence means but differ
in their competence variance. PCS is only beneficial to populations with high variance (pur-
ple and red lines). Figure 5 present the individual errors distribution of the Flags and Dogs
datasets, the Flags dataset has a bimodal distribution, meaning that there are distinct groups of
”good” and ”bad” workers. The Dogs dataset has a unimodal distribution. This might explain
why over the Flags dataset PCS reduces the loss better than over the Dogs dataset.
5 Explaining Leaders Weights
In the previous section, we observed empirically that competent leaders tend to get more followers
and thus higher weight. We are interested in a theoretical model that explains this phenomenon.
One such result was given by Cohensius et al. [3] for the limit case of infinite binary questions that
Figure 5: individuals errors histogram. On the left the Flags dataset shows bimodal distribution of
individuals errors, Dogs on the right shows unimodal distribution of individuals errors.
are answered by followers α · k → ∞. In this case, all followers select either the best or the worst
leader, according to which one is closer. However, in realistic scenarios (including our datasets), the
number of questions is typically dozens to hundreds.
We model a simplified version of the problem, where there is one follower which is requested to
choose a leader amongst two possible leaders in a binary domain. Given a worker’s competence, we
only know the distribution of his answers, and we want to estimate the probability that the follower
would choose the better leader.
Bounding the probability of a follower to choose the incompetent leader Consider two leaders,
High and Low, with judgment competence ph, pl respectively, such that ph > pl > 0.5. In addition,
consider a follower Z with judgment competence pz > 0.5. W.l.o.g. x∗ = 1. Thus xh,xl and x˜z
are random binary vectors of length k. For simplicity, denote
sh = xh(>(x˜z)), sl = xl(>(x˜z)), sz = x˜z(>(x˜z)).
That is, sh, sl and sz are the answers of High, Low and Z to the questions answered by Z. Hence
sh, sl and sz are random binary vectors of length αk, whose entries are ‘1’ with respective proba-
bilities of ph, pl and pz .
Lemma 2.
Pr(d(sh, sz) ≥ d(sl, sz)) ≤ exp
(
−αk(ph − pl)
2(2pz − 1)2
2
)
.
Proof. Define the random variable Bi such that
Bi =

1 High and Z disagree, Low and Z agree
−1 High and Z agree, Low and Z disagree
0 Otherwise
where agreement/disagreement is with respect to the i-th question. Since the entries of sh, sl and
sz are independent, so are Bi and Bi′ for i 6= i′. Notice that
E(Bi) = E(Bi|s(i)z = 1)Pr(s(i)z = 1) + E(Bi|s(i)z = 0)Pr(s(i)z = 0)
= pz ((1− ph)pl − ph(1− pl)) + (1− pz) (ph(1− pl)− (1− ph)pl)
= (2pz − 1)(pl − ph).
Notice that d(sh, sz)− d(sl, sz) ∼
∑k
i=1Bi, therefore
Pr(d(sh, sz) ≥ d(sl, sz)) = Pr(d(sh, sz)− d(sl, sz) ≥ 0) = Pr
(
k∑
i=1
Bi ≥ 0
)
= Pr
(
1
k
k∑
i=1
Bi − E(Bi) ≥ −E(Bi)
)
(1)
By invoking Lemma 3 on Equation (1), we obtain the desired result.
Lemma 3 (Hoeffding’s Inequality). Let B1 . . . Bk be i.i.d. r.v. such that Bi ∈ [−1, 1] and E(Bi) =
µ. For every t > 0 it holds that
Pr
(
1
k
k∑
i=1
Bi − µ ≥ t
)
≤ exp
(
−kt
2
2
)
.
That is, the probability of Z selecting Low decreases exponentially in the distance between Low’s
and High’s competence levels. Another observation is that if pz approaches 0.5 (i.e. an incompetent
follower), then the term in Lemma 2 approaches e0, in other words, incompetent followers spread
their weight roughly evenly over all leaders, whereas competent followers are substantially more
likely to give their weight to a competent leader.
This supports the intuitive argument from [3] regarding the “Anna Karenina principle” (as good
workers are indeed similar to one another), and thus at least partially explains the weight distribution
of leaders.
6 Discussion
We introduced Proxy Crowdsourcing (PCS), an aggregation method that collects complete vectors
and partial vectors of answers. The method then uses the partial vectors to weigh the complete vec-
tors. We showed that this method can reduce the expected error in various crowdsourcing domains.
PCS can be used in addition to other aggregation methods. Our conjecture is that for a wide range
of aggregation methods, adding PCS to the aggregation method will improve the outcome. We ob-
serve that indeed this is the case for a wide variety of domains. Table 2 shows that PCS improves the
outcome for Plurality and Mean aggregation rules. Similar results were obtained for the Median
rule.
Allowing Self Selection In the experiment discussed in this paper we preallocated workers into
leaders and followers. However preallocation is not mandatory, a requester can allow workers to
choose after a sample of questions whether they wish to leave (followers) or to complete the survey
(leaders). We hypothesize that allowing workers to self select their role can further improve the
results. This can be done by using a bonus scheme that motivates the strong workers to become
leaders and the weak workers to become followers. In preliminary experiments we saw that PCS
with self selection produce more accurate outcome than self selection alone.
Allowing followers to choose their leader Previous work [3] assumed that when given the option
to choose their leader, followers follow the leader closest to them. In this work we wanted to test
this assumption, by allowing followers to choose which leader they prefer out of a predefined set
of leaders. We verified that indeed in crowdsourcing tasks, when workers are paid by the number
of correct answers, followers tend to follow the leader closest to them. In an early setting of our
experiment, followers were asked: ”Why did you choose to follow this leader?” We observe two
types of answers:
• The random follower: ”I was unsure about my choices”
• The closest leader follower: ”Choosing someone who guessed like I did would save time, and
would likely give similar results.”
This verifies our assumption that followers tend to follow the closest proxy.
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